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Abstract
Is online disinformation impacting how voters
view political parties? Although many scholars claim
that online disinformation (or fake news) is having
negative effects on democracy, there are few studies
that examine the impact of online disinformation at the
individual level. In this study I conducted a
randomized survey of 400 Taiwanese respondents in
order to assess the impact of online disinformation on
their political behavior. The respondents completed
one of three surveys and were exposed to either a
control article or a social media post containing
disinformation. Controlled exposure was found to
have a significant impact on the party identification of
those exposed to the post for the first time compared
to those who had previously been exposed to the post.
The results of this study show that disinformation can
have an effect on party identification, however further
studies are necessary to determine the size and
direction of this effect.

1. Introduction
Online disinformation campaigns have been
used by governments, militaries, political parties and
private citizens to manipulate public opinion in 70
countries, many of which are democracies [1].
Politicians, pundits, and scholars have all made dire
claims about how online disinformation is eroding the
fabric of modern democracy [2, 1]. They argue that a
public whose worldviews are formulated based on
false information will not be able to select candidates
that represent their interests [3]. However, much of the
concern surrounding online disinformation is not
backed by solid evidence. Studies attempting to
examine the impact of online disinformation have
found wildly different results, yet none absolutely
confirm that online disinformation is harming
democracy [4]. Attempts to combat online
disinformation have led to extreme measures in some
countries including internet shutdowns and laws that
restrict free speech [5].
Taiwan is at the epicenter of the debate over
how a government should respond to online
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disinformation. Online disinformation in Taiwan is
generated both internally and from mainland China.
In response, the Democratic People’s Party (DPP)
passed an anti-infiltration law that is designed to
combat interference from mainland China [6].
However, proponents of press freedom strongly
opposed the bill believing that it would obstruct free
speech in Taiwan [6]. It is necessary to assess the
impact of online disinformation on political views as
political actors are enacting legislation against a
phenomenon that so far has not been empirically
demonstrated to alter elections.
In this study I analyze the impact of online
disinformation on Taiwanese voter’s political
identification. Disinformation is designed with the
intention of spreading false beliefs while
misinformation is false information that is spread
regardless of intention [7]. This study focuses only on
disinformation as it allows actors to potentially alter
democracy in a way misinformation does not.
Disinformation is created with the intention of
destroying the public’s understanding of reality while
misinformation can be an honest misinterpretation of
the facts. In the broader literature disinformation is
often termed fake news, however I use the term
disinformation as it has only one meaning while fake
news can be a genre (pseudo-journalistic
disinformation) as well as a label (used to
delegitimize news media) [8].Within the scope of this
study I analyze how exposure to online
disinformation impacts party identification.
The existing literature on online
disinformation primarily focuses on the United States
and Europe. Fewer studies outside of these contexts
have looked at the impacts of online disinformation.
My study is the first of its kind in Taiwan, however it
is theoretically linked to studies elsewhere in the
world and contributes to the broader literature. Using
survey data from 400 random respondents in Taiwan
I analyzed the impact of controlled exposure to
online disinformation on party identification. After
exposure respondents completed an extensive
debrief. Exposure to online disinformation was found
to impact party identification for first time viewers
relative to those already exposed.
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2. Hypotheses
Once someone sees a false article, one would
assume that its positive or negative portrayal of a
political party would cause that individual to have an
equivalent response towards said political party.
However, studies have revealed that polarization can
interfere with people’s reception and understanding
of information. For this study I used Guess et al.’s [9]
definition of polarization as the difference in people’s
feelings toward their preferred party and the
opposition party. Studies have shown that
partisanship can bias information processing in the
brain, and even people’s perceptual judgements of
content [10]. Political psychology research has shown
that partisanship and ideology form over a long
period of time due to a wide variety of mechanisms
[11]. This slow formation of ideology makes it so
that it is difficult for new information to change
people’s longstanding views.
Psychological research shows that partisans are
often “directionally motivated”, meaning they seek
out information that reinforces their preferences
rather than accurate information [12]. Even if people
are confronted with facts that counter their
preconceived beliefs, they still may not be convinced
by them [10]. This effect is similar for online
disinformation in that people will reinforce their
preexisting beliefs with false articles. Studies in the
U.S. looking into polarization have found that online
disinformation does not impact voters’ feelings
towards political parties [9]. Information received by
those who are already highly partisan is unlikely to
alter their preconceived beliefs [13]. Taiwan is a
good case to test whether the studies on online
disinformation’s impact on polarization conducted in
the U.S. are transferable to other parts of the world.
Taiwan is in many ways similar to the U.S. in
having: a polarized electorate, a similar internet
penetration rate, and is subjected to online
disinformation campaigns from both foreign and
internal actors. The similarity of polarization will
allow for a test of the echo chamber theory outside of
the U.S. The echo chamber theory is often applied to
Taiwan, despite it being a relatively young
democracy, as it is highly polarized [14, 15]. The
echo chamber theory asserts that online communities
disaffected by mainstream media share information
that goes unchallenged and these communities
become more partisan as they reinforce each other’s
views [16]. The main area in which polarization
differs between the U.S. and Taiwan is that the
primary point of contention in Taiwan surrounds its

relationship with mainland China [17]. Proponents of
the Kuomintang party (KMT) would like closer ties
with mainland China, while the DPP does not. This
study tests if online disinformation can impact
polarization, when the difference between parties is
not “left” or “right” but rather relates to Taiwan’s
relationship with mainland China. Taiwan is highly
partisan, so online disinformation once seen is still
unlikely to alter respondents’ perceptions of political
parties.
H1: Online disinformation will not impact
respondents’ reported polarization among partisans;
party identification will not be impacted by
disinformation.

3. Methodology
To test the hypotheses, I developed a survey
and posted it on Facebook from April 17 th to April
28th, 2020. I posted a Facebook advertisement with a
link to the survey. Respondents were told that the
survey was designed to assess the effects of media on
politics in Taiwan. The respondents were
incentivized with a randomly distributed $20 raffle
prize for three respondents. The advertisement
targeted the entirety of Taiwan and in total I received
400 completed surveys. This is a convenience sample
composed of people who decided to take the survey.
This paper is primarily designed to develop theory;
therefore, a convenience sample is preferred as this
allows me to verify an existence result: whether or
not online disinformation has an impact [18]. If there
is an effect, later studies with representative samples
can establish the external validity of online
disinformation’s impact on the Taiwanese electorate.
The survey gathered respondents’
demographic information including age, gender,
education, and location. I also asked for their history
of sharing news on Facebook, party identification,
media trust and perceived accuracy of the post, as
these might be explanatory factors for how people
perceive online disinformation. To measure the
respondents’ intention to vote, I asked about their
voting history and plan to vote in the next election.
There were 15 partially completed responses. Only
survey respondents that had completed all four parts
of the survey were included in the analyses which
totaled 400 valid responses.
Taiwan has five different political parties
that hold national representative positions in the
legislative yuan, however only two, The DPP and the
KMT hold the vast majority of seats. The anti-KMT
post shows a photograph from a China unification
parade of people waving Republic of China and
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Chinese Communist Party flags and mistakenly says
that this photo was taken at the Ting Han parade,
which was in support of the KMT’s presidential
candidate Han Kuo-yu [19]. The text says that if the
KMT candidate is elected it will be the end of
Taiwan, insinuating that the KMT candidate will
allow for unification with mainland China, which is
highly unpopular among Taiwanese people [19]. The
anti-DPP post asserts that the DPP wants to pass
legislation that radically increases sentencing
leniency towards drug possession on school
campuses [20]. The control article is about a
professional video game player who is speculated to
be leaving his team soon [21]. The control is
apolitical so that differences in stated party
identification in the experimental groups solely
reflect the effect of online disinformation. A control
allows us to see if the survey design is conducive to
producing consistent responses between the pre- and
post-exposure portions and allows for a comparison
between political and apolitical content. The video
game player mentioned in the control does not have
well publicized political views, and the video game is
played worldwide and isn’t associated with any
political entity. Ideally, there would have been a pure
control with exposure to no article, however with 400
respondents it is unlikely that statistical analysis with
two separate controls would yield any significant
results.
I analyzed pre- and post-exposure selfreported party identification with four political
parties: KMT, DPP, New Power Party (NPP), and
People First Party (PFP). The inclusion of two
additional parties, the NPP and PFP, allow for a
check of whether exposure to disinformation can
affect party identification with non-directly targeted
parties.
Partisan identification is difficult to alter as
researchers studying campaigns generally have
contested whether any information impacts voter
behavior. Research on campaigns has found that the
core values of voters are unlikely to change based on
material presented, but that some information can
impact vote choice as voters become better informed
about candidates [13]. The effect of information is
often quite small, Spenkuch & Toniatti [22] found
that television advertisements were found to change
the voting preferences of only 1-3 people out of
10,000.
Respondents were randomly exposed to an
anti-DPP post, an anti-KMT post, or a control article.
Once the survey was completed there was an
extensive debrief. The respondents of the
experimental groups were told that the post they had

seen was false. Respondents were given an
explanation of why the post was false from the
Taiwan Fact Check Center. The respondents were
then asked if they understood that the post was false
and asked to select the correct name of the fact check
center.
To test the hypothesis, I constructed a
dependent variable that’s takes the value of 1 if party
identification changed from pre-exposure to postexposure for the DPP or KMT. Respondents
answered on a 4-point Likert scale how closely they
identified with each of the major parties in Taiwan
before and after exposure to the post. For most
respondents there was no change in identification.
The identification of the majority of respondents did
not change over the course of the survey: 87% of
respondents had no change in identification towards
the KMT or DPP, while 13% had changes in
identification for these two parties. 22.75% of
respondents had changes in party identification when
considering all four parties, while 77.25% had no
changes in party identification. I ran an additional
regression with a value of 1 if party identification
changed for any party pre- and post-exposure.
The age range of the respondents was 18 to
77, however the respondents tended to be younger,
with 60% under the age of 30. Gender was divided
between male and female at 48.5% and 50.5%
respectively and .5% identified as other. 59.5% of
respondents were college educated. 74.9% of
respondents were from urban areas. The most skewed
demographic was the party identification category,
where 38.4% identified with the DPP while only 4%
identified with the KMT; the rest were either
independent, other, or identified with another party.
For a full list of descriptive statistics see the
appendix.

4. Who is swayed by disinformation?
I regressed whether there was a change in
identification for the DPP or KMT on exposure to
disinformation while controlling for education, party
affiliation, perceived accuracy of the story, level of
media trust, and previous exposure to the post. I
included an interaction effect between previous
exposure to the post and party affiliation. Education
[23], party affiliation [13], and media trust [16, 23]
have all been theorized to be contributing factors in
how online disinformation is received. For party
affiliation the reference category is independent, so
all changes in identification are relative to those who
identify as independent. Enough respondents
identified with the DPP that it could be its own
variable, while there were not enough respondents for
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each of the other parties to be their own variables.
The variable of ‘other parties’ includes those who
identify with the KMT, PFP, NPP and those who
selected ‘other party’. For education, college is the
reference category. For the two experimental groups
‘anti-DPP post’ and ‘anti-KMT post’ the control is
the reference category.
I included the independent variable of
‘accuracy’ because the impact of how accurate the
post was perceived to be on changes in party
identification is underexamined. Guess et al. [9]
found that belief in false articles was not correlated
with changes in voters’ feelings towards political
parties. However, it is intuitive to believe that posts
which negatively portray a party, if believed, would
alter a respondent’s views towards that political
party, therefore this experiment allows for a test of
Guess et al.’s [9] findings. For the accuracy variable,
those who said the post was inaccurate constitute the
reference category.
I also included interaction effects for those
who had already seen either post before, to determine
what the difference is between first time exposure
and repeated exposures. 230 of the respondents had
not previously seen the posts while 170 had already
seen the posts. Within the experimental groups, 41%
of the anti-DPP group and 59% of the anti-KMT
group had already seen the post. I included
interaction effects for party identification and
exposure to the post in order see how partisanship
effected first time viewers versus those already
exposed.
The results showed that the effect of the
posts was largely insignificant for both experimental
groups. In the first model there appears to be no
significant impact of exposure to online

disinformation. Once the interaction effect is
included and the groups are divided by whether the
respondent had previously seen the post, the effects
of exposure were significant. Those who had not seen
the post previously were more likely to have their
party identification changed than those who had
previously seen the post. This suggests that exposure
to the post for the first time did impact respondents’
party identification with the KMT or DPP. Those
who had seen the post before, likely in a normal
social media environment, were significantly less
likely to have their identification changed. This may
be because they have already seen the post debunked
by a fact checking website, or because they have
previously processed the content of the post, so the
post did not have an additional effect.
Model 3 shows that those who identified
with the DPP were significantly less likely than
independents to change their opinion, however model
4 shows that regardless of party affiliation exposure
to disinformation had no significant impact on
changing party identification. Model 3 and 4 show
that education level, perceived accuracy of the story
and amount of trust in the media did not have
significant effects on whether the respondents’ party
identification changed. Education had previously
been linked to an increased ability to discern the
veracity of news [24]. However, the ability to
accurately determine if a post was true did not seem
to have a significant effect on whether the respondent
changed their party identification. The level of trust
in the media had an insignificant impact on whether
people changed their opinion. Online disinformation
has been shown to lower media trust, but it did not
appear that this decreased media trust was correlated
with increased susceptibility to changing party
identification [25].
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Table 1. Logistic regression of change in party identification for the DPP and KMT
(Constant)
Anti-KMT post
Anti-DPP post

Model 1
-2.106***(.283)
.168(.384)
.405(.369)

Model 2
-2.442***(.369)
1.103*(.501)
.938*(.472)

High school or less
Post grad
DPP
Other parties
Accuracy
Media trust

Model 3
-1.567*(.776)
1.195*(.514)
1.172*(.503)

Model 4
-1.349(.821)
.583(.717)
.991(.629)

-.421(.607)
-.453(.356)
-1.342***(.404)
-.358(.371)
.630(.385)
-.143(.216)

-.390(.611)
-.461(.362)
-2.547*(1.093)
-.511(.703)
.624(.396)
-.137(.217)

Anti-KMT x have seen
-2.298**(.800)
-2.235**(.831)
-2.239**(.846)
Anti-DPP x have seen
-1.600*(.772)
-1.675*(.800)
-1.609*(.819)
Have seen post
1.099(.588)
1.014(.607)
.968(.634)
Anti-KMT x DPP
1.790(1.289)
Anti-DPP x DPP
1.354(1.243)
Anti-KMT x other
-.181(.921)
party
Anti-DPP x other party
.766(.960)
-2LL
307.855
298.380
283.953
280.255
Cox and Snell’s R
.003
.026
.060
.069
squared
Nagelkerke’s R
.006
.049
.112
.128
squared
N
400
400
399
399
Note: binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets.
* p< .05, ** p < .01, *** p< .001

Additionally, I regressed whether there was
a change in identification for all four parties on
exposure to disinformation while controlling for
education, party affiliation, perceived accuracy of the
story, change in media trust, and previous exposure
to the disinformation. This regression had increased
statistical power as 52 respondents had changes in
identification for the KMT or DPP, while 91 had
changes in identification for all four parties. The
results were similar to the previous regression
however the interaction variable was not significant.
This suggests that previous exposure to the post had
less of an impact on identification changes for other
parties than those directly mentioned in the posts.

4.1 Note on identification changes:
The changes in identification were not
consistently negative as one would expect. Both of
the experimental posts had negative content against a
party and should have caused people to have more
negative views of the parties. However, it may be the
case that for those whose party was attacked by the
post, their identification with their party increased as
they sympathized with their party in the face of the
inflammatory disinformation put out by the
opposition. Negative campaigning has been shown to
lead to a backlash effect, where the attacking party is
evaluated lower [26]. This backlash effect can also
positively impact parties who are neither the target of
the attack nor the attacker [27]. Table 2 shows that
change in party identification were comparable
between the KMT and DPP and the other two parties.
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Table 2. Change in party identification by exposure group
Positive
Negative
Positive
Negative
change
change
Change DPP
Change
KMT
KMT
DPP
Control
4
5
4
5
Anti-KMT
6
2
6
6
post
Anti-DPP
5
5
7
9
post

5. Discussion
The results indicate that those who identified
with a party were not significantly impacted by
exposure to disinformation. This is in line with
Jacobson’s [13] finding that highly partisan people
are unlikely to change their opinions based on new
information. This confirms the hypothesis that online
disinformation did not impact partisan respondents’
reported polarization.
However, independents were similarly not
impacted by exposure to disinformation. This
suggests that partisanship is not the only reason why
a post might not change the opinions of a respondent.
Independents are still somewhat partisan as studies in
the U.S. have found that many independents do have
partisan preferences [28]. These results suggest that
future research should examine aspects beyond the
impact of partisanship when assessing the impact of
disinformation.
Despite the overall lack of change in opinion
due to disinformation, it appears that disinformation
still may have an effect. There was a significant
change in party identification between those who had
seen the story before and those who had not. This
suggests that the post only impacted first-time
viewers. Additionally, having seen the post may
mean that the respondent is more likely to regularly
consume disinformation. Guess et al. [9] found that
those who consume more disinformation tend to have
more polarized feelings towards political parties.
Therefore, the decrease in the likelihood of these
respondents to change their identification with
political parties may be due to increased polarization
of this demographic rather than the impact of the
article. However, this study did not capture enough
information about respondents’ disinformation or
general media consumption to confirm whether these
results reflect the impact of first-time exposure, or the
characteristics of those who regularly consume
disinformation.

Positive
change all four
parties
15
21

Negative
Change all four
parties
22
21

31

23

To confirm the results of this study more
robust studies need to be conducted. The effect of
disinformation may be quite small and undetectable
in a group of 400 respondents. Given that the
majority of those sampled had no change in opinion
and that the changes in opinion were divided into
three exposure groups, the binary logistic regressions
were based on relatively small sample sizes. Small
sample sizes can lead to false discoveries [29].
Further studies with larger samples are necessary to
confirm these results, especially to obtain results that
are externally valid for Taiwan as a whole.
Additionally, there are no medium to long term
studies on the effects of disinformation [7]. This
study only examined brief exposure to disinformation
and future studies which examine long term effects
are necessary.
Additionally, this study was unable to factor
in all of the contributing factors that determine
political ideology. There are nearly innumerable
factors that can contribute to ideological viewpoints,
from socio-economic status [30] communal beliefs
[31], personality traits [32], to even basic
neurocognitive functioning [33]. Future studies will
need to look at what other factors contributing to
party identification are also linked to susceptibility of
being influenced by online disinformation.
The changes in party identification were not
only negative as predicted but rather both positive
and negative. The impact of online disinformation
cannot be easily predicted, and may have a negative
or positive impacts on party identification, consistent
with the findings of Galasso et al. [27]. This study
also shows that disinformation can change party
identification, including for parties that are not
directly attacked. Spillover effects of negative
advertisements are currently underexplored in the
literature, and further studies are needed to theorize
why we observe this phenomenon.
This study found that the majority of
respondents did not have changes in party
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identification, which may be due to them either
ignoring the disinformation or because
disinformation reinforced their current views. This
study did not find a significant difference between
independents and partisans when exposed to
disinformation which would contradict the echo
chamber theory. Additionally, the level of media trust
was insignificant in whether people changed party
identification or not. This suggests that counter to the
echo chamber theory, people who were less trusting
of mass media were not more susceptible to having
their views altered by disinformation. The
inapplicability of the echo chamber theory may be
due to differences between the Taiwanese online
media environment versus those in western settings.
However, this study was also unable to act as a full
test of the echo chamber theory. To properly test the
echo chamber theory, it is necessary to understand
the totality of a respondent’s media consumption.
Exposure to an individual post may have a limited
effect, but when online disinformation makes up a
more significant amount of an individual’s media
consumption, there may be a more substantial impact.
Ideally, to test the change in polarization the sample
would have been more representative of the various
parties. In this sample the DPP was well represented
while the KMT had relatively few supporters. This
made it difficult to accurately measure changes in
polarization.

disinformation in controlled and natural settings can
have different effects [9]. Future studies should also
incorporate the impact of interpersonal
communication that social media allows. The twostep theory of communication purports that
individuals are far more likely to change their
opinion based on interpersonal interactions than from
mass media outlets [34]. Social media allows for
mass interpersonal communication, and
disinformation may be most effective when it is
delivered from interpersonal contacts rather than in a
survey [35]. Additionally, the fact that the level of
trust in media was inconsequential in whether people
changed their identification supports the two-step
flows of communication theory in suggesting that
respondents were not receptible to media alone, but
may need an opinion leader or interpersonal
interaction to influence them.
Moreover, this experiment featured no pure
control. Although the news article presented in the
control was not related to politics, respondents still
changed their party identification after exposure.
There may have been political biases present in the
article that I was unaware of. The changes in party
identification suggest either that the article had an
effect or that some respondents provided careless
answers. Previous studies have shown that up to 1012% of responses to a survey may be done carelessly
[36].

The effect of online disinformation is
contingent upon the content of post shown. The antiKMT post, was seven times more likely to be
perceived as accurate by respondents than the antiDPP post. Therefore, the content of disinformation is
highly important when evaluating the effect of
disinformation. This study mirrored many
contemporary studies in assuming that the effect of
different pieces of disinformation would be similar.
Ideally in future tests there would be a space for
respondents to fill in their opinion of each post, so
that there can be a qualitative assessment of why
certain posts are perceived to be more accurate.
Future tests will need to take the unequal effects of
different posts into consideration when assessing the
impact of exposure to online disinformation. This
study also showed that despite the differences in
perceived accuracy of the stories, the difference
between first time exposure to the article and
previous exposure was still present. This suggests
that the perceived accuracy of the post may not be
what changed respondents party identification.

One takeaway from this study is that future
studies need to be cautious with debriefs after
exposure to disinformation. After the debrief, the
group exposed to the anti-DPP article had 8
respondents who selected that they did not
understand that the story was false. For the anti-KMT
article, 25 people did not understand that the article
was false. The debrief explained to respondents why
the article was false, however it appears that many
respondents disagreed or did not properly complete
the debrief. The majority of those who did not
understand that the post was false had previously
seen the post before, suggesting that they had already
regarded the post as fact and could not be dissuaded
from this view. This is concerning as the
methodology of exposing people to disinformation
has been used in other studies, including medical
information about COVID-19 [9, 37]. Future studies
need to be aware of the potential dangers of exposing
respondents to disinformation and need to collect
data on the effectiveness of their debriefs.

Additionally, this study only takes into
account exposure in a controlled setting. Previous
work has shown that exposure to online

These results have ramifications not only for
Taiwan, but for democracies impacted by
disinformation across the world. A future study
determining the size of the effect of disinformation
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on changes in political identification, and how people
respond to online disinformation in a normal media
environment, is necessary to further assess the impact
of false stories. Online disinformation is not harmless
however there is also a cost to combating it.
Disinformation is often indistinguishable from satire
and curbing disinformation can also curb free speech.
In order to properly decide what measures should be
taken against disinformation, more studies are
necessary to examine who is affected and what the
size of this impact.
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